Remember, 2+2=4. It is difficult sometimes not to
succumb, to lie to yourself, and to say, 2+2=5. But it
doesn't...Even though Martha Stewart is on trial
instead of Kenny Boy Lay, even though the Chairman of
the BBC has been forced to resign instead of the
shell-of-a-man-formerly-known-as-Tony Blair, even
though war heroes have their patriotism challenged
while chickenhawks are protected by the "US mainstream news media...Remember, 2+2=4...
Center for American Progress: Unfortunately, Kay and
the Administration are now attempting to shift the
blame for misleading America onto the intelligence
community. But a review of the facts shows the
intelligence community repeatedly warned the Bush
Administration about the weakness of its case, but was
circumvented, overruled, and ignored. The following is
year-by-year timeline of those warnings...
Repudiate the 9/11 Cover-Up and the Iraq War Lies,
Show Up for Democracy in 2004: Defeat Bush (again!)
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=24889
Neglecting Intelligence, Ignoring Warnings: A chronology of how the Bush Administration repeatedly and deliberately refused to listen to intelligence agencies that said its case for war was weak
January 28, 2004
Updated January 29, 2004
Download: DOC, PDF, RTF
Former weapons inspector David Kay now says Iraq
probably did not have WMD before the war, a major blow
to the Bush Administration which used the WMD argument
as the rationale for war. Unfortunately, Kay and the
Administration are now attempting to shift the blame
for misleading America onto the intelligence
community. But a review of the facts shows the
intelligence community repeatedly warned the Bush
Administration about the weakness of its case, but was
circumvented, overruled, and ignored. The following is
year-by-year timeline of those warnings.
2001: WH Admits Iraq Contained; Creates Agency to
Circumvent Intel Agencies
In 2001 and before, intelligence agencies noted that
Saddam Hussein was effectively contained after the
Gulf War. In fact, former weapons inspector David Kay
now admits that the previous policy of containment –
including the 1998 bombing of Iraq – destroyed any
remaining infrastructure of potential WMD programs.
OCTOBER 8, 1997 – IAEA SAYS IRAQ FREE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: "As reported in detail in the progress
report dated 8 October 1997…and based on all credible
information available to date, the IAEA's verification
activities in Iraq, have resulted in the evolution of
a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine
nuclear programme. These verification activities have
revealed no indications that Iraq had achieved its
programme objective of producing nuclear weapons or
that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of
weapon-usable nuclear material or had clandestinely
acquired such material. Furthermore, there are no
indications that there remains in Iraq any physical
capability for t he production of weapon-usable
nuclear material of any practical significance."
[Source: IAEA Report, 10/8/98]
FEBRUARY 23 & 24, 2001 – COLIN POWELL SAYS IRAQ IS
CONTAINED: "I think we ought to declare [the
containment policy] a success. We have kept him
contained, kept him in his box." He added Saddam "is
unable to project conventional power against his
neighbors" and that "he threatens not the United
States." [Source: State Department, 2/23/01 and
2/24/01]
SEPTEMBER 16, 2001 – CHENEY ACKNOWLEDGES IRAQ IS
CONTAINED: Vice President Dick Cheney said that
"Saddam Hussein is bottled up" – a confirmation of the
intelligence he had received. [Source: Meet the Press,
9/16/2001]
SEPTEMBER 2001 – WHITE HOUSE CREATES OFFICE TO
CIRCUMVENT INTEL AGENCIES: The Pentagon creates the
Office of Special Plans "in order to find evidence of
what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, believed to be true-that Saddam Hussein had
close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous
arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even
nuclear weapons that threatened the region and,
potentially, the United States…The rising influence of
the Office of Special Plans was accompanied by a
decline in the influence of the C.I.A. and the D.I.A.
bringing about a crucial change of direction in the
American intelligence community." The office,
hand-picked by the Administration, specifically
"cherry-picked intelligence that supported its
pre-existing position and ignoring all the rest" while
officials deliberately "bypassed the government's
customary procedures for vetting intelligence."
[Sources: New Yorker, 5/12/03; Atlantic Monthly, 1/04;
New Yorker, 10/20/03]
2002: Intel Agencies Repeatedly Warn White House of
Its Weak WMD Case
Throughout 2002, the CIA, DIA, Department of Energy
and United Nations all warned the Bush Administration
that its selective use of intelligence was painting a
weak WMD case. Those warnings were repeatedly ignored.
JANUARY, 2002 – TENET DOES NOT MENTION IRAQ IN NUCLEAR
THREAT REPORT: "In CIA Director George Tenet's January
2002 review of global weapons-technology
proliferation, he did not even mention a nuclear
threat from Iraq, though he did warn of one from North
Korea." [Source: The New Republic, 6/30/03]
FEBRUARY 6, 2002 – CIA SAYS IRAQ HAS NO WMD, AND HAS
NOT PROVIDED AL QAEDA WMD: "The Central Intelligence
Agency has no evidence that Iraq has engaged in
terrorist operations against the United States in
nearly a decade, and the agency is also convinced that
President Saddam Hussein has not provided chemical or
biological weapons to Al Qaeda or related terrorist
groups, according to several American intelligence
officials." [Source: NY Times, 2/6/02]
APRIL 15, 2002 – WOLFOWITZ ANGERED AT CIA FOR NOT
UNDERMINING U.N. REPORT: After receiving a CIA report
that concluded that Hans Blix had conducted
inspections of Iraq's declared nuclear power plants
"fully within the parameters he could operate" when
Blix was head of the international agency responsible
for these inspections prior to the Gulf War, a report
indicated that "Wolfowitz ‘hit the ceiling’ because
the CIA failed to provide sufficient ammunition to
undermine Blix and, by association, the new U.N.
weapons inspection program." [Source: W. Post,
4/15/02]
SUMMER, 2002 – CIA WARNINGS TO WHITE HOUSE EXPOSED:
"In the late summer of 2002, Sen. Graham had requested
from Tenet an analysis of the Iraqi threat. According
to knowledgeable sources, he received a 25-page
classified response reflecting the balanced view that
had prevailed earlier among the intelligence
agencies--noting, for example, that evidence of an
Iraqi nuclear program or a link to Al Qaeda was
inconclusive. Early that September, the committee also
received the DIA's classified analysis, which
reflected the same cautious assessments. But committee
members became worried when, midway through the month,
they received a new CIA analysis of the threat that
highlighted the Bush administration's claims and
consigned skepticism to footnotes." [Source: The New
Republic, 6/30/03]
SEPTEMBER, 2002 – DIA TELLS WHITE HOUSE NO EVIDENCE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS: "An unclassified excerpt of a 2002
Defense Intelligence Agency study on Iraq's chemical
warfare program in which it stated that there is ‘no
reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has - or
will - establish its chemical warfare agent production
facilities.’" The report also said, "A substantial
amount of Iraq's chemical warfare agents, precursors,
munitions, and production equipment were destroyed
between 1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert
Storm and UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission)
actions." [Source: Carnegie Endowment for Peace,
6/13/03; DIA report, 2002]
SEPTEMBER 20, 2002 – DEPT. OF ENERGY TELLS WHITE HOUSE
OF NUKE DOUBTS: "Doubts about the quality of some of
the evidence that the United States is using to make
its case that Iraq is trying to build a nuclear bomb
emerged Thursday. While National Security Adviser
Condi Rice stated on 9/8 that imported aluminum tubes
‘are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs,
centrifuge programs’ a growing number of experts say
that the administration has not presented convincing
evidence that the tubes were intended for use in
uranium enrichment rather than for artillery rocket
tubes or other uses. Former U.N. weapons inspector
David Albright said he found significant disagreement
among scientists within the Department of Energy and
other agencies about the certainty of the evidence."
[Source: UPI, 9/20/02]
OCTOBER 2002 – CIA DIRECTLY WARNS WHITE HOUSE: "The
CIA sent two memos to the White House in October
voicing strong doubts about a claim President Bush
made three months later in the State of the Union
address that Iraq was trying to buy nuclear materials
in Africa." [Source: Washington Post, 7/23/03]
OCTOBER 2002 — STATE DEPT. WARNS WHITE HOUSE ON NUKE
CHARGES: The State Department’s Intelligence and
Research Department dissented from the conclusion in
the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD
capabilities that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear
weapons program. "The activities we have detected do
not ... add up to a compelling case that Iraq is
currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an
integrated and comprehensive approach to acquiring
nuclear weapons." INR accepted the judgment by Energy
Department technical experts that aluminum tubes Iraq
was seeking to acquire, which was the central basis
for the conclusion that Iraq was reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program, were ill-suited to build
centrifuges for enriching uranium. [Source,
Declassified Iraq NIE released 7/2003]
OCTOBER 2002 – AIR FORCE WARNS WHITE HOUSE: "The
government organization most knowledgeable about the
United States' UAV program -- the Air Force's National
Air and Space Intelligence Center -- had sharply
disputed the notion that Iraq's UAVs were being
designed as attack weapons" – a WMD claim President
Bush used in his October 7 speech on Iraqi WMD, just
three days before the congressional vote authorizing
the president to use force. [Source: Washington Post,
9/26/03]
2003: WH Pressures Intel Agencies to Conform; Ignores
More Warnings
Instead of listening to the repeated warnings from the
intelligence community, intelligence officials say the
White House instead pressured them to conform their
reports to fit a pre-determined policy. Meanwhile,
more evidence from international institutions poured
in that the White House’s claims were not
well-grounded.
LATE 2002-EARLY 2003 – CHENEY PRESSURES CIA TO CHANGE
INTELLIGENCE: "Vice President Dick Cheney's repeated
trips to CIA headquarters in the run-up to the war for
unusual, face-to-face sessions with intelligence
analysts poring over Iraqi data. The pressure on the
intelligence community to document the
administration's claims that the Iraqi regime had ties
to al-Qaida and was pursuing a nuclear weapons
capacity was ‘unremitting,’ said former CIA
counterterrorism chief Vince Cannistraro, echoing
several other intelligence veterans interviewed."
Additionally, CIA officials "charged that the
hard-liners in the Defense Department and vice
president's office had 'pressured' agency analysts to
paint a dire picture of Saddam's capabilities and
intentions." [Sources: Dallas Morning News, 7/28/03;
Newsweek, 7/28/03]
JANUARY, 2003 – STATE DEPT. INTEL BUREAU REITERATE
WARNING TO POWELL: "The Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR), the State Department's in-house
analysis unit, and nuclear experts at the Department
of Energy are understood to have explicitly warned
Secretary of State Colin Powell during the preparation
of his speech that the evidence was questionable. The
Bureau reiterated to Mr. Powell during the preparation
of his February speech that its analysts were not
persuaded that the aluminum tubes the Administration
was citing could be used in centrifuges to enrich
uranium." [Source: Financial Times, 7/30/03]
FEBRUARY 14, 2003 – UN WARNS WHITE HOUSE THAT NO WMD
HAVE BEEN FOUND: "In their third progress report since
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 was passed in
November, inspectors told the council they had not
found any weapons of mass destruction." Weapons
inspector Hans Blix told the U.N. Security Council
they had been unable to find any WMD in Iraq and that
more time was needed for inspections. [Source: CNN,
2/14/03]
FEBRUARY 15, 2003 – IAEA WARNS WHITE HOUSE NO NUCLEAR
EVIDENCE: The head of the IAEA told the U.N. in
February that "We have to date found no evidence of
ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related
activities in Iraq." The IAEA examined "2,000 pages of
documents seized Jan. 16 from an Iraqi scientist's
home -- evidence, the Americans said, that the Iraqi
regime was hiding government documents in private
homes. The documents, including some marked
classified, appear to be the scientist's personal
files." However, "the documents, which contained
information about the use of laser technology to
enrich uranium, refer to activities and sites known to
the IAEA and do not change the agency's conclusions
about Iraq's laser enrichment program." [Source: Wash.
Post, 2/15/03]
FEBURARY 24, 2003 – CIA WARNS WHITE HOUSE ‘NO DIRECT
EVIDENCE’ OF WMD: "A CIA report on proliferation
released this week says the intelligence community has
no ‘direct evidence’ that Iraq has succeeded in
reconstituting its biological, chemical, nuclear or
long-range missile programs in the two years since
U.N. weapons inspectors left and U.S. planes bombed
Iraqi facilities. ‘We do not have any direct evidence
that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to
reconstitute its Weapons of Mass Destruction
programs,’ said the agency in its semi-annual report
on proliferation activities." [NBC News, 2/24/03]
MARCH 7, 2003 – IAEA REITERATES TO WHITE HOUSE NO
EVIDENCE OF NUKES: IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei
said nuclear experts have found "no indication" that
Iraq has tried to import high-strength aluminum tubes
or specialized ring magnets for centrifuge enrichment
of uranium. For months, American officials had "cited
Iraq's importation of these tubes as evidence that Mr.
Hussein's scientists have been seeking to develop a
nuclear capability." ElBaradei also noted said "the
IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside
experts, that documents which formed the basis for the
[President Bush’s assertion] of recent uranium
transactions between Iraq and Niger are in fact not
authentic." When questioned about this on Meet the
Press, Vice President Dick Cheney simply said "Mr.
ElBaradei is, frankly, wrong." [Source: NY Times,
3/7/03: Meet the Press, 3/16/03]
MAY 30, 2003 – INTEL PROFESSIONALS ADMIT THEY WERE
PRESSURED: "A growing number of U.S. national security
professionals are accusing the Bush administration of
slanting the facts and hijacking the $30 billion
intelligence apparatus to justify its rush to war in
Iraq . A key target is a four-person Pentagon team
that reviewed material gathered by other intelligence
outfits for any missed bits that might have tied Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein to banned weapons or
terrorist groups. This team, self-mockingly called the
Cabal, 'cherry-picked the intelligence stream' in a
bid to portray Iraq as an imminent threat, said
Patrick Lang, a official at the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). The DIA was "exploited and abused and
bypassed in the process of making the case for war in
Iraq based on the presence of WMD," or weapons of mass
destruction, he said. Greg Thielmann, an intelligence
official in the State Department, said it appeared to
him that intelligence had been shaped 'from the top
down.'" [Reuters, 5/30/03 ]
JUNE 6, 2003 – INTELLIGENCE HISTORIAN SAYS INTEL WAS
HYPED: "The CIA bowed to Bush administration pressure
to hype the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons
programs ahead of the U.S.-led war in Iraq , a leading
national security historian concluded in a detailed
study of the spy agency's public pronouncements."
[Reuters, 6/6/03]