January 30, 2004

Evidence not included in Hutton's report

Here, compiled by The Scotsman, is some of the most
important (and DAMNING) evidence concerning the
shameful involvement of the-shell-of-a-man-formerly
known-as-Tony-Blair in the events leading to the
alleged suicide of Dr. David Kelly. These facts were
not included in the final report of "Lord"
Hutton...Remember, 2+2=4...

The Scotsman: Tom Kelly, one of the Prime Ministerís
spokesmen, wrote in an e-mail: "This is now a game of
chicken with the Beeb - the only way they will shift
is if they see the screw tightening."

Repudiate the 9/11 Cover-Up and the Iraq War Lies,
Show Up for Democracy in 2004: Defeat Bush (again!)


The Scotsman:

Evidence not included in Hutton's report

11 August

"As probably the most senior intelligence community
official working on WMD, I was so concerned about the
manner in which intelligence assessments were being
presented in the dossier that I was moved to write ...
recording and explaining my reservations.

"The existing wording is not wrong but has lots of
spin on it." - Martin Howard, chief of Defence
Intelligence, on what a senior official had written.

14 August

The inquiry heard of Tony Blairís request to bring
back David Kelly from a training day before a trip to
Iraq for a second interview. Geoff Hoon overruled Sir
Kevin Tebbit and ordered Dr Kelly should appear in
public before the Commonsí foreign affairs committee
because a private hearing would be "presentationally
difficult". Sir Kevin had said there should be "some
regard for the man himself" (Dr Kelly). "He is not on

John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence
Committee, said Dr Kelly should face a "security-style
interview", evidence which went against claims that
normal MoD disciplinary procedures were followed.

Memo from Sir David Omand, Cabinet Office intelligence
and security co-ordinator ... "recorded the Prime
Ministerís view that before we decided on the next
steps that should be taken, it would be sensible to go
into a bit more detail into the difference between
what Dr Kelly had said and what Andrew Gilligan had

18 August

An e-mail of 5 September, 2002 showed Alastair
Campbell ordered a "substantial rewrite" of the WMD
dossier after a meeting with Mr Blair.

Jonathan Powell, Mr Blairís chief of staff, later
wrote of the dossier: "The document does nothing to
demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat,
from Saddam."

Tom Kelly, one of the Prime Ministerís spokesmen,
wrote in an e-mail: "This is now a game of chicken
with the Beeb - the only way they will shift is if
they see the screw tightening."

19 August

In a memo to Alastair Campbell, John Scarlett said
that changes had been made to the text (of the
dossier) "as you proposed": "We have strengthened the
language on current concerns and plans, including the
executive summary."

An e-mail from Philip Basset, one of Mr Campbellís
advisers: "Very long way to go, I think. Think weíre
in a lot of trouble with this (the dossier) as it
stands now."

20 August

Alastair Campbell floated the idea to Geoff Hoon, the
Defence Secretary, that Dr Kellyís name be leaked to a
friendly newspaper - he was later persuaded this was
not a good idea.

Sir Kevin Tebbit said: "I was told the Prime Minister
was following this very closely indeed ... the
intelligence was that he wanted something done about
the individual (Dr Kelly) coming forward."

26 August

An e-mail showed Downing Street made a desperate final
plea for stronger evidence for the dossier: "No 10
wants the document to be as strong as possible within
the boundaries of the available intelligence. this is
therefore a last (!) call for any items of
intelligence that the agencies think can and should be

27 August

Geoff Hoon, having heard an official had admitted
talking to the BBC, said: "It did appear that this
perhaps was an opportunity to demonstrate that
unauthorised contacts with journalists would be looked
at seriously."

1 September

Janice Kelly, Dr Kellyís widow, said the Ministry of
Defence told her husband he would not be named and he
felt betrayed when he was.

3 September

Dr Brian Jones, head of the Defence Intelligence Staff
analysing WMD, said the "shutters came down" before
the reservations about the dossier in the intelligence
community - especially the 45-minute claim - had been
discussed. "Our reservations about the dossier were
not reflected in the final version."

Dr Jones also said a chemical weapons expert said
there was a "tendency to over-egg certain

4 September

Geoff Hoonís special adviser, Richard Taylor, said Mr
Hoon was present at a meeting to discuss a "naming
strategy" for Dr Kelly. Mr Hoon had not mentioned this
in his evidence.

Posted by richard at January 30, 2004 01:07 PM