If the NYTwits, or the WASHPs, had been serious in
their *mea culpas* about failing to serve the TRUTH in
the run-up to the increasingly unhinged and incredibly
shrinking _resident's foolish military adventure in
Iraq, you wouldn't have to rely on this kind of
analysis being translated from the French
"Liberation," you would be reading in the pages of the
NYTwits, or the WASHPs, but the painful reality is
that they are still carrying the filthy water of the
Bush abomination on Iraq and as you will see again
this week, 9/11 as well...
Jean-Dominique Merchet interviews Eric Denécé,
Liberation: How did that happen?
In two ways. First, there was the establishment of
new tightly controlled offices outside of the CIA,
such as the Office of Strategic Plans and the Office
of Strategic Influence. They produced syntheses that
went in the direction the powers-that-be wanted. In
the heart of the CIA, some young guys took advantage
of the windfall to draw up their reports to match what
they thought the powers-that-be wanted to read! It's a
company where the internal quarrels are very intense
and which has evolved profoundly since the end of the
Cold War. The former generation had a very European
culture, very New England. Now you meet more boorish
people, often from the South or from Texas, whose
world view is, let us say, more limited.
Repudiate the 9/11 Cover-Up and the Iraq War Lies,
Show Up for Democracy in 2004: Defeat Bush (again!)
http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/071904H.shtml
"The Secret Services were Used"
By Jean-Dominique Merchet
Libération
Friday 16 July 2004
Eric Denécé, an intelligence expert, analyzes the CIA
and MI6 Iraqi arsenal fiasco.
In Washington as in London, two official reports
have just called the secret services into question
over the weapons of mass destruction (wmd) affair in
Iraq. In the United States, a Senate report accuses
the CIA of having exaggerated the threat; while in the
United Kingdom, Lord Butler deems that MI6 has
committed serious mistakes. In both cases, political
responsibilities have been spared. Are the secret
services "scapegoats" to protect George W. Bush and
Tony Blair? Eric Denécé, Director of the French Center
for Intelligence Research (CF2R), provides his
analysis.
Were the American and British secret services
really fooled about the Iraqi threat?
Less than is believed. Before the summer of 2002,
they had never been caught in any flagrant mistake and
had not stopped telling political officials that they
had no proof of the existence of wmd. However, from
the moment the White house decided to go to war
against Iraq, pressure on the CIA became intense
because what the agency was saying did not suit the
neoconservative team. Something very similar happened
in Great Britain with Tony Blair's spin doctors' team.
How did that happen?
In two ways. First, there was the establishment of
new tightly controlled offices outside of the CIA,
such as the Office of Strategic Plans and the Office
of Strategic Influence. They produced syntheses that
went in the direction the powers-that-be wanted. In
the heart of the CIA, some young guys took advantage
of the windfall to draw up their reports to match what
they thought the powers-that-be wanted to read! It's a
company where the internal quarrels are very intense
and which has evolved profoundly since the end of the
Cold War. The former generation had a very European
culture, very New England. Now you meet more boorish
people, often from the South or from Texas, whose
world view is, let us say, more limited.
How do these intelligence services work?
There are numerous filters between the agent who
collects the intelligence on the ground and the memo
that arrives on the President's desk. At the core of
the CIA, intelligence is given form by Operations
Management, which transmits it to Intelligence
Management, where the analysts in their turn draw up
syntheses they transmit to the Director, who assumes
political responsibility. Afterwards, all that is
milled again with what comes from the other agencies,
such as electronic surveillance (NSA) or military
intelligence (DIA). The conditional phrases and the
cautions that you find at the beginning of the chain
get transformed into assertions that point in the
direction desired by the powers-that-be.
Always?
When you look for one thing, you don't find
something else! The way a question is asked partially
induces the answer. They were looking for wmd; they
found clues to their existence. In an ideal world and
to have a more balanced view, two teams should have
been set to work simultaneously; the one looking for
wmd, the other playing devil's advocate, looking for
proof of their disappearance.
Will this affair leave its mark on the
relationship between political power and the
intelligence services?
Undoubtedly, and especially in England where they
enjoyed a high level of trust. The secret services run
the risk of losing a part of their soul in all this
because they feel they have been totally used. This is
even the first time ever that democracies justify a
war with the argument: "Our intelligence services told
us..."
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Translation: t r u t h o u t French language
correspondent Leslie Thatcher.
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